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ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER IS A FINAL ORDER THAT IS
APPEALABLE UNDER RULE 3(a) OF THE UTAH RULES OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE.
In accordance with this Court's November 26. 2003. Order, the arguments set out

in Sections I through V below, address the jurisdictional issue raised by the Appellees in
their October. 2002, Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Appellate Jurisdiction. For the
reasons stated in those Sections, this Court should find that the Third Judicial District
Court's September 5. 2002. Summary Judgment and Order to Arbitrate ("Order*") is a
final order under Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedures and is appealable
as of right under the Utah Constitution.1
A.

The Order Is Final Under Rule 3(a) Because It Disposed of All Claims
and Parties in the Underlying Action.

The Appellees do not dispute that the Trial Court's Order is a final order. (Brief
of Appellees at 9-10.) It is well-settled under the Supreme Court's final judgment rule
that "%[a]n appeal may be taken from a district. . . court to the appellate court with
jurisdiction over the appeal from all final orders and judgments". Utah R. App. P. 3(a)
(emphasis added). The Supreme Court has further explained that "a trial court's order or
judgment must dispose of all parties and claims to an action" to be a final order or final
judgment. Bradbury v. Valencia. 2000 UT 50, % 10. 5 P.3d 649, 651 (Utah 2000).

1

If this Court does not deem the Order to be final. UTA asks this Court to treat UTA's
notice of appeal as a petition for permission to appeal an interlocutory order under Rule 5
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and to submit argument on that alternative as
directed bv the Court.
I

In the present case, the Trial Court completely disposed of all of the parties and
claims to this action. Here, the Appellees filed a Complaint to seek an order to compel
arbitration under the Collective Bargaining Agreement Between Utah Transit Authority
and Amalgamated Transit Union. Local 382 ("Labor Contract"). (Complaint to Compel
Arbitration at 1.) When the Trial Court granted the Appellees* Motion for Summary
Judgment and ordered arbitration, the Trial Court wholly disposed of that claim.
Additionally, no party to the lawsuit required any further action of the Trial Court
following the issuance of the Order. Lastly, the Trial Court did not retain jurisdiction
over the parties nor the issues for arbitration. On the contrary, the Trial Court transferred
all remaining issues to an arbitral forum. Accordingly, the Trial Court disposed of all
claims and parties to the action under the Order. By doing so. the Trial Court*"
unmistakably issued an order that is final under the Supreme Court's final judgment rule.
B.

State and Federal Courts Have Similarly Found Orders Compelling
Arbitration to Be Final Orders.

The Appellees' inference that "[a]s a general rule", other jurisdictions have found
that orders compelling arbitration are not final and not appealable, is exaggerated. (Brief
of Appellees (**Br. Appellees*") at 9.) As referenced in the annotation cited by the
Appellees, a number of state courts have found that orders compelling arbitration are
final under the states' statutes and jurisprudence on final judgments. See David B.

2

The Trial Court judge also appears to have believed the Order to be final and
appealable. See Transcript of Hearing Held August 20. 2002 (the Honorable Judge
Timothy Hanson stating that ". . . if Tm wrong, I'm sure one of the appellate courts will
have no problem telling me about it").
2

Harrison. Annotation. Appealability of State Court's Order or Decree Compelling or
Refusing to Compel Arbitration. 6 A.L.R. 4th 652. 3a (2002) citing EvansvilleVanderburgh Sch. Corp. v. Evansville Teachers Assoc. 494 N.E.2d 321, 322. 324-25
(Ind. App. 1986) (court setting forth history of split authority on finality of orders
compelling arbitration, and deciding that the order in that case was final and appealable);
Hosiery Mfrs. Corp. v. Goldston. 143 N.E. 779 (N.Y. 1924); Systems Constr. Inc. v.
Worthington Forest Ltd.. 345 N.E.2d 428. 429-30 (Oh. App. 1975). Likewise, the Trial
Court's Order disposed of all claims and parties consistent with Utah"s final judgment
rule.
Federal courts haye also concluded that such orders are final orders when the
question of arbitrability was the only issue before the lower courts. See, e.g., Great Earth
Cos.. Inc. v. Simons. 288 F.3d 878. 884 (6th Cir. 2002); S+L+H S.P.A. v. Miller-St.
Nazianz. Inc.. 988 F.2d 1518 (7th Cir. 1993); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Lai. 42 F.3d 1299.
1302 (9th Cir. 1994). Similarly here, the Trial Court reviewed only an arbitrability
question. In short, the characterization of the Order in the present case as final, is
consistent with other state and federal court rulings on similar orders that address only
arbitrability and dispose of that claim by ordering arbitration.
C.

There Is No Express Legislative Exclusion of Orders Compelling
Arbitration to Undermine the Appealability of the District Court's
Order Under Rule 3(a).

UTA ma\ appeal a final order compelling arbitration in accordance with Rule 3(a)
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure ("Rule 3(a)" or "Rule""). Rule 3(a) provides for
the appeal of "all final orders and judgments, except as otherwise provided by law"".

3

Utah R. App. P. 3(a). That Rule unambiguously contemplates that "all final orders and
judgments" are presumed to be appealable unless there is an affirmative exception in the
law. Nevertheless, the Appellees* would have this Court interpret Rule 3(a) to require the
Legislature to affirmatively include an order that is appealable.
In their Brief, the Appellees suggest that an order compelling arbitration is not
appealable because it is not listed under Section 78-3 la-19 of the Utah Arbitration Act.
(Br. Appellees at 11.) Under that approach, the Legislature would in theory be required
to enumerate every order or judgment that may be appealed. That approach is unsound
for two main reasons. First, although a right of appeal must be grounded in a specific
legislative authorization if the order appealed from is not final. Bradburv. 535 P.3d at
651, such an express authorization is not needed in the case of final orders disposing of
all issues and parties/
Second, the Appellees* position unravels the Rule's clear presumption that final
orders are appealable. If every final order that could be appealed was also to be expressly

' This Court's recent dicta in Miller v. USAA Cas. Insur. Co. does not alter that
conclusion. 44 P.3d 663. 671 (Utah 2002). In Miller, the Court examined in part
whether an order to appraise was a final order that may be appealed. In a footnote, the
Court commented that *%an order compelling appraisal is not appealable before a final
judgment is entered because the statute is explicitly limited to denial of motions to
compel arbitration". Id. That comment is inconsequential here for three main reasons.
First, the Court was considering orders to appraise, not orders to arbitrate. The Court
expressly ruled that appraisals are *"intrinsic[ally] differentft] from arbitrations and that
the Utah Arbitration Act was not applicable in that case. Second, whereas an order to
appraise leaves the underlying claims still pending, this Order completely resolved the
claim raised by the Appellees before the Trial Court. Miller at 671. Third, no statutory
exception to the final judgment rule is required here because the Order appealed from is
indisputably final.
4

stated as such in the law. then the presumption of appealability under Rule 3(a) would be
rendered meaningless. Certainly, the Court did not intend to so negate the plain meaning
of its own Rule. In the present case, there is no explicit exclusion of orders compelling
arbitration. The Legislature's mere silence on such orders in Section 78-3la-19 cannot
overcome the Rule 3(a) presumption of appealability of final orders compelling
arbitration.
Federal guidance also supports a right of appeal of final orders compelling
arbitration even if those orders are not expressly listed as appealable. The Utah Supreme
Court has previously looked to federal interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act to
construe the Utah Arbitration Act because "the provisions of [those Acts] (both were
based on the Uniform Arbitration Act)" "are nearly identical". Buzas Baseball. Inc. v.
Salt Lake Trappers. Inc.. 925 P.2d 941. 948 (Utah 1996) citinz Brickyard Homowners*
Ass'n Management Comm. v. Gibbons Realty, 668 P.2d 535, 540 (Utah 1983) (Court
stating that "Identity in language [in Utah and federal statutes] presumes identity of
construction, so that we look to federal . . . law for guidance"'). In that case, the Court
**adopt[ed] the federal courts' interpretation as Utah law". Id. ("reserving] the right to
adopt a different construction for the Utah Arbitration Act than that given to the Federal
Arbitration Act should [a Utah] statute or the facts warrant").
Even before Congress adopted Section 16 of the Federal Arbitration Act. which
enumerated appeals that may be taken, federal courts determined that certain orders
compelling arbitration are appealable. As noted by one such court:

5

Before the adoption of section 16. whether an order granting or denying a
motion to compel arbitration was appealable depended on whether it was a final
decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Whether the order was final depended in turn on
whether the sole object of the suit was to determine arbitrability. [citation omitted]
If the order was issued in an independent action in which the only issue before the
court was the dispute's arbitrability. the order was considered final because it
"ends the judgment/* [citation omitted]
Stedor Enterprises. Ltd. v. Armtex. Inc.. 947 F.2d 727. 729 (4th Cir. 1991). Just as some
federal courts were willing to find an order compelling arbitration to be appealable
without specific legislation stating that such an order is appealable, this Court should be
willing to find that the Trial Court's Order is appealable even though such an order is not
listed in Section 78-3 la-19 of the Utah Arbitration Act.
Furthermore, federal guidance strongly infers that the Section 78-3 la-19 list of
appeals that may be taken is not intended to exclude other appeals, but instead to include
certain appeals. In Stedor. the court explained that Congress added the section 19 list of
orders from which an appeal may be taken under the Federal Arbitration Act "to
implement Congress* 'deliberate determination that appeal rules should reflect a strong
policy favoring arbitration [citation omitted]". That court stated that the policy is in part
supported by Section 19 because that Section permits persons to "immediately* appeal a
"refus[al] to stay litigation . . . refus[al] to compel arbitration . . . den[ial of] confirmation
[of] . . . or modifjication]. correction], or vacatfing] of an arbitral award. . . . or
granting], continuing], or modification of] an injunction against arbitration . . . even if
interlocutory in nature \ Stedor at 729 (emphasis added). At the same time, the intent of
the Section 19 list is to allow for more expedient appeals on certain orders that may or
may not be final. Thus, the intention is not to exclude otherwise appealable orders.

6

Because Utah courts turn to federal courts interpretation and application of the
Federal Arbitration Act for guidance, this Court should likewise find that the Utah
Legislature simply wished to promote policy supporting arbitration by allowing for
immediate appeals of certain orders identified in subparagraphs (1) through (5) of Section
78-3 la-19, even if those orders are not final. Further, this Court should find that the
Legislature did not wish to preclude otherwise appealable final orders such as the order
compelling arbitration at issue here.
II.

SECTION 5 OF ARTICLE VIII OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION
SECURES UTA'S RIGHT TO APPEAL THE FINAL ORDER
COMPELLING ARBITRATION.
A.

Article VIII of the Constitution Establishes a Broad Right of Appeal
That Applies to This Case.

Section 5 of Article VIII of the Utah Constitution compels an immediate appeal of
the Order. That Section provides, in pertinent part, that:
The district court shall have appellate jurisdiction as provided by statute. The
jurisdiction of all other courts, both original and appellate, shall be provided by
statute. Except for matters filed originally with the Supreme Court, there shall be
in all cases an appeal of right from the court of original jurisdiction to a court
with appellate jurisdiction over the cause.
UTAH CONST,

art VIIL § 5 (amended 1984) (emphasis added). The first two sentences of

the above-quoted language center on procedure. Those sentences authorize the Utah
Legislature to distribute matters that are appealable between the district courts, the Court
of Appeals, and the Supreme Court. By comparison, the third sentence solidifies a
substantive right of appeal "from the court of original jurisdiction to a court with
appellate jurisdiction over the cause", apart from cases originating in the Supreme Court.

7

Thus, with a limited exception that does not apply in the instant case, the Framers of the
Utah Constitution secured an appeal of right in all cases arising in a court of original
jurisdiction. Here, the Order appealed from properly originated with the district court
under the Utah Arbitration Act. Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-3 la-1 et seq. (2003).
Consequently. UTA has a constitutional right to appeal this case from the district court to
a court with appellate jurisdiction.
The Appellees' proposition that the Article VIII constitutional right of appeal may
be nullified by the Legislature is misguided. (Br. Appellees at 10 ("the law may provide
that some final orders are not appealable as a matter of right")); see, e.g., State ex. rel. v.
Durand. 36 Ut. 93 (1909) (Supreme Court recognizing that a court's power to review all
cases may not be increased or decreased by the legislature). In connection with its
proposition, the Appellees point to acquittals from criminal charges and small claims
judgments following a trial de novo. (Br. Appellees at 11.) However, those examples
provide no meaningful support to the Appellees' proposition.
First, the prohibition against State appeals of acquittals in criminal matters is
grounded in the Constitution itself. State v. Musselman. 667 P.2d 1061. 1065 (Utah
1983). Specifically, the federal and State constitutional protection against double
jeopardy is read together with the Article VIII right of appeal. Id. In Musselman. those
two constitutional rights appear to be reconciled to ensure adequate protection under each
such right. The Appellees* view that that the Supreme Court in State v. Kelbach
determined as a general rule "that the right of appeal could be [so] limited by statute" as
to eliminate an opportunity to appeal, overstates that holding. (Br. Appellees at 15.) In

8

Kelbach. the Supreme Court only denied the right of appeal under a statute that strikes a
balance between the competing constitutional rights of double jeopardy and appeal. 569
P.2d 1100 (Utah 1977). That result is far different from the result proposed by Appellees,
the latter of which would allow a law other than a constitutional provision to override the
Article VIII right of appeal, when there is no competing constitutional interest against
appeal. However, there can be no dispute that the Legislature is powerless to wholly
usurp a constitutional right.4 See, e.g. State v. Eldredge. 76 P. 337. 339 (Utah 1904).
Second, small claims judgments following a trial de novo aire appealable. While
Section 78-6-10(2) of the Utah Code limits the manner of appeal of such judgments, the
judgments are not barred altogether. Therefore, the Legislature has not in that example
completely barred the right of appeal secured under Article VIII. That example stands in
sharp contrast to the absolute bar that the Appellees' would raise against UTA's right of a
appeal of an order compelling arbitration in this case. In sum. the Appellees" proposition

4

UTA does not take issue with the Appellees statement that "the constitutional right of
appeal can be limited (not eliminated) by both legislative statute or court rule". (Br.
Appellees at 16.) The Supreme Court and the Legislature may set time and manner
limitations that still leave open the opportunity to meaningfully exercise the
constitutional right of appeal. Howe\er. the right of appeal cannot eliminated through
such limitations.
It also bears mentioning that Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure is
consistent with the Article VIII constitutional right of appeal. Although that Rule affords
an exception to appeals from all final orders and judgments "as otherwise provided by
law*\ that exception similarly does not allow for a complete bar to the right of appeal by
laws less supreme than the Utah Constitution. Based on the same supremacy law
principles, the exception clause of that Rule must be construed to allow only for
constitutionally-based exceptions, or exceptions grounded in time and manner restrictions
on the right of appeal that do not completely nullify that right.
9

that laws less supreme than the Constitution may override the Article VIII right of appeal
is inimical to supremacy law principles and is unproven by their two examples.
B.

Appellees' Theory Stands to Prevent UTA from Exercising Its
Constitutional Right to Appeal a Case from the District Court.

The Appellees' theory that Section 78-3 la-19 of the Utah Arbitration Act
precludes an appeal of an order compelling arbitration runs afoul of UTA*s constitutional
right to appeal a case in three key ways. (Br. Appellees at 11-12.) First the Appellees*
theory is improperly premised on the assumption that the Legislature may curb the right
of appeal set out in Section 5 of Article VIII of the Utah Constitution. In particular, the
Appellees argue that the Legislature intended to prevent appeals of orders compelling
arbitration because it was silent on the appealability of such orders under Section 78-3 la19. (Br. Appellees at 11-12.) However, because the Utah Constitution is the supreme
law of this State, it trumps any legislative enactments that are. or are argued to be. in
conflict with its provisions. Eldredge at 339. Therefore. Appellees* theory is fatally
flawed at its core because it presumes that silence of the Legislature on the appealability
of certain arbitration orders can unravel the constitutional right of appeal clearly set forth
in Article VIII.
Second, the Appellees* theory risks an absolute bar to any UTA appeal of this case
in clear contradiction to the constitutional right of appeal of all cases, apart from those
arising in the Supreme Court. The Appellees contend that UTA is not prohibited from
appealing the arbitrability decision because it ma\ later "appeal to the Utah Supreme
Court following a District Court order either confirming, denying, or modifying the

10

arbitration decision"". (Br. Appellees at 14.) However, that contention ignores the
pragmatics of this Order.
Here, the Trial Court ruled that the parties will pursue a two-tiered arbitration.
Under the Order, the parties are first required to arbitrate the question of "whether or not
the termination of employment of Caroline Jolley-Christensen by the Utah Transit
Authority (UTA) was based upon her abilities, competency, fitness, and qualifications to
perform work" (hereinafter, the "First Question"). (Order at 2.) If UTA is successful in
an arbitration of that First Question, it will not have an avenue of review of the Trial
Court's arbitrability decision. For instance, if UTA were to prevail on the First Question,
it would not seek an order to vacate the award under subparagraph (5) of Section
78-31a-19. and it would not obtain appellate review of the arbitrability question now
presented to this Court by appealing the confirming, modification, or correction of an
arbitration award. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 la-19(3), (4) (2003).
In brief, if this Court adopts the Appellees theory that appeal rights are limited by
the Legislature's list under Section 78-3 la-19, UTA will have no opportunity to obtain
review of the arbitrability issue if it succeeds in the First Question of the ordered
arbitration. Thus, the Appellees' theory stands to preclude an appeal of this case from a
court of original jurisdiction to a court of appellate jurisdiction. As a result, the
Appellees theory is wholly at odds with Article VIII of the Utah Constitution.
Third, contrary to the Appellees assertion, the Cade v. Zions First National Bank
decision does not hint that final orders compelling arbitration are not appealable under
the Utah Arbitration Act. 956 P.2d 1073 (Utah App. 1998). Relying on dicta in that

11

case, the Appellees mistake the issue presented. (Br. Appellees at 12.) There, this Court
was focused on whether Cade waived his right to challenge an order to arbitrate after the
arbitration had occurred. The Court ruled that Cade did not waive that right. By so
ruling, the Court did not hold that final orders compelling arbitration are not appealable
immediately following their issuance. When referencing orders compelling arbitration
that were not appealable in other jurisdictions, the Court was most concerned with
"clearly interlocutory orders". In contrast, the Order appealed here is clearly final.
C.

UTA's Right to Appeal the Order Has Not Been Clearly Lost or
Abandoned.

The record plainly shows that UTA has not lost or abandoned, or otherwise
waived, its right of appeal under Article VIII of the Utah Constitution. The Supreme
Court has acknowledged the importance of that right of appeal. The Court long ago
noted that "[t]he right to an appeal is a valuable and constitutional right and ought not to
be denied except where it is clear the right has been lost or abandoned*. Adamson v.
Brockbank. 112 Utah 52. 60 (1947) (Court examined whether an individual had waived
the right of appeal under predecessor language to Section 5 of Article VIII of the Utah
Constitution) (emphasis added).
In view of the broad constitutional language anchoring a right of appeal, and the
Supreme Court's concern for guarding that right, there should be no abrogation of UTA's
constitutional right of appeal absent an obvious waiver, loss, or abandonment. Here,
there is no basis for concluding that UTA waived, or otherwise lost or abandoned, its

12

right of appeal. On the contrary. UTA has vigorously pursued that right in accordance
with applicable appeal procedures.
III.

THIS COURT HAS EXPRESS AUTHORITY TO REVIEW AN APPEAL
OF AN ORDER COMPELLING ARBITRATION.
The Appellees have misconstrued UTA's reliance on Section 78-2-2 of the

Judicial Code. UTA does not rely on Section 78-2-2(3)(j) for the proposition that the
Section '"mandates an appeal right"" as stated by the Appellees. (Br. Appellees at 16.)
Rather. UTA has maintained that Article VIII of the Utah Constitution establishes the
appeal right, and Section 78-2-2(3)(j) provides an avenue for exercising that right. (Br.
Appellant at 3). In particular. Sections 3 and 5 of Article VIII of the Constitution
expressly provide for the legislative distribution of jurisdiction between the appellate
courts. See UTAH CONST, art. VIIL § 3 (amended 1984) C[t]he Supreme Court [has]
appellate jurisdiction over all [other] matters to be exercised as provided by statute"");
UTAH CONST,

art. VIIL § 5 ("The jurisdiction of all other courts, both original and

appellate, will be provided by statute**). In turn, the Legislature allocated broad appellate
reviewing powers to the Supreme Court. For instance, by statute the Supreme Court may
review "orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the Court of
Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction"". Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3 )(j)
(2003).
It is within the jurisdiction of this Court to review UTA"s appeal. First, the
Supreme Court has jurisdiction over an order compelling arbitration because the Court of
Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction over such an order, and the Supreme

13

Court has jurisdiction over "orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over
which the Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction". Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2003). Second, the portion of the Order appealed by UTA which
compels arbitration is certainly an "order"' and "judgment*" of a "court of record", as
those terms are used in Section 78-2-2(3)(j). See also Guardian Title Co. v. Mitchell.
2002 UT 63 1j 11. 54 P.3d 130. 132 (summary judgment component of an order is a final,
appealable order under Utah common law). Third, because the Order is reviewable by
the Supreme Court, that Court may transfer reviewing authority to the Court of Appeals
under Section 78-2-2(4) of the Judicial Code. Fourth, there is no state statute that
undercuts the Supreme Court's jurisdiction and, thereby, this Court's jurisdiction, to hear
this case. While Appellees appear to contend that Section 78-3 la-19 of the Utah
Arbitration Act deprives the Court of jurisdiction, that Section does not expressly erode
the jurisdiction that is otherwise expressly granted under Section 78-2-2(3)(j). The
Legislature's silence under Section 78-3 la-19 on the subject of orders compelling
arbitration cannot be meaningfulh construed as seizing the expressly granted jurisdiction
of the appellate courts under Sections 78-2-2. In view of the significant constitutional
right at issue here, those Sections must be interpreted to allow for the jurisdiction of this
Court absent a clear exclusion to the contrary. For all of those reasons, this Court's
authority to review this case is secure.
IV.

THE 2003 AMENDMENTS TO THE UTAH ARBITRATION ACT
AFFIRMED A RIGHT OF APPEAL THAT ALREADY EXISTS UNDER
THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.
The Utah Legislature undertook a comprehensive revision of the Utah Arbitration
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Act during the 2002 legislative session. Pursuant to Senate Bill 171. the Utah Arbitration
Act was replaced in its entirety by the Utah Uniform Arbitration Act. S.B. 171. 2002
Gen. Sess. A close inspection of the new Act and the legislative history surrounding that
Act. reveals a clear intent of the Legislature to simply adopt a uniform law recommended
by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. See UNIF.
ARBITRATION ACT (2000). Among other textual differences between the old and new
Acts, the new Act included in the list of appeals that may be taken "a final judgment
entered pursuant to this Chapter**.
The Appellees erroneously contend that the addition of that "final judgment"
language to the list of appeals that may be taken means that the Legislature intended to
omit such "final judgments" under Section 78-3 la-19 of the former Act. (Br. Appellees
at 13-14.) For two key reasons, that contention amounts to only conjecture. First, as
addressed more fully infra. UTA has an existing constitutional right to appeal the Order
irrespective of the legislative change. Thus, the Legislature's adoption of the additional
appeal language in Section 78-3 la-129 of the 2003 Act is a mere codification of UTA's
already settled right to appeal the Order.
Second, the addition of the "final judgment" language in the list of appeals that
may be taken is not the product of a deliberate revision of that Section. Rather, the
change is just one portion of a blanket rewriting of Utah's arbitration laws. Instead of
intending to alter particular areas of the former Act. the Legislature intended to bring its
laws into conformance with the revised uniform law adopted across the Country.
Unsurprisingly then, there is no evidence from the floor debates from either chamber that
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the Legislature intended to change any appeal rights when it unanimously adopted the
new Act. Utah State Sen. Floor Debates on Senate Bill 27 L February 27. 2002 (bill
introduced to Senate without comment on appeals). For those reasons, the Legislature's
silence on the addition of the "final judgment*" provision is less a reflection of any
specific intent, and more plausibly a continuation of a right of appeal of final orders
compelling arbitration.
Third, as argued more fully infra at 6-7. federal court interpretation of the Federal
Arbitration Act urges that an appeal of a final order compelling arbitration is not
precluded simply because it is not listed as an order that may be immediately appealed.
V.

AN IMMEDIATE REVIEW OF THE ORDER COMPELLING
ARBITRATION IS COMPELLED BY LOGIC AND FAIRNESS.
The Appellees* preference that UTA pursue this appeal after the conclusion of the

arbitration would require UTA to expend significant time and expense to arbitrate a
question that UTA contends is not arbitrable. UTA agrees that it may have a right of
appeal of the arbitrability issue following the arbitration, but only if it loses on the first or
second question to be arbitrated. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 la-14(l)(e) (allowing a
party to an arbitration agreement to move to vacate an arbitration award on the grounds
that "there was no arbitration agreement between the parties to the arbitration
proceeding**): Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 la-19(3) (providing for an appeal of a district court
order "denying confirmation of [an] arbitration award""). Nonetheless, that avenue
requires that all of the parties expend considerable time and resources for naught if UTA
later prevails on its appeal of the arbitrability issue. Furthermore, UTA may continue to
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incur the costs of future such arbitrations based on the Trial Court's interpretation of the
Labor Contract. See Flatland Real Estate Co. v. Dugas Const., Inc.. 784 So.2d 867, 871
(La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2001) (supporting appeal of order compelling arbitration in part
because '"reversal of the trial court's order of arbitration would eliminate need for parties
to submit to that proceeding"). Such an outcome poses an unreasonable economic risk
born by all parties.
It bears reiterating that any appeal right that UTA may have following an
arbitration is limited to instances in which UTA loses in the arbitration. If UTA prevails
at the arbitration, it will have no means of seeking review of the Order. See infra at 1011. Thus, under the Appellees' theory, UTA may continue to expend time and public
moneys on arbitrations without any opportunity to seek a review of the threshold
arbitrability question.
VI.

UTA PROPERLY PRESERVED ISSUES A AND B.
The Appellees' "belief* that '"UTA did not properly preserve Issues 'A' and ' B ' "

lacks merit. (Br. Appellees at 2.) With regard to Issue A, UTA discussed with the Trial
Court the Article 13 procedural pathway, the consequences of the Union's failure to
follow that pathway, and the Trial Court's obligation under the Labor Contract to
determine the arbitrability question. (Tr. 16-18.) In that discussion. UTA plainly
addressed Issue A with sufficient specificity and with reference to pertinent contractual
and legal authority to allow the Trial Court to consider the Issue. See Badger v. Brooklyn
Canal Co.. 966 P.2d 844. 847 (Utah 1998). Thus, the Appellees incorrectly state that
'"[t]he only reference to any argument on those two issues . . . was a couple of sentences
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during oral argument". (Br. Appellees at 2.) Similarly. Appellees erroneously assert that
Issue A was not mentioned in the pleadings. On the contrary. UTA introduced the issue
on page 7 of its Reply Memorandum In Support of Utah Transit Authority's Motion for
Summary Judgment. Further. UTA was not required to list Issue A in its Docketing
Statement to preserve the Issue for appeal. Utah courts have decided that an appellant is
not prohibited from raising on appeal an issue not detailed in its docketing statement.
Nelson v. Salt Lake Citv. 919 P.2d 568. 572 (Utah 1996). Finally, in the same dialogue
with the Trial Court on Issue A. UTA recited the specific provision of Section 78-3 la-4
of the Judicial Code, and suggested to the Trial Court Judge that he should decide
whether Jolley's termination was arbitrable under the Labor Contract, rather than
deferring that question to an arbitrator. (Tr. At 18.) Thus, UTA offered the Trial Court a
sufficient opportunity to decide that issue before he issued the Order.
VII.

THE APPELLEES' FAILURE TO FOLLOW THE LABOR CONTRACT'S
ARTICLE 13 GRIEVANCE PROCESS VOIDS ITS ARGUMENTS IN
FAVOR OF ARBITRATION OF THE ARBITRABILITY QUESTION.
A.

The Appellees Lost Their Opportunity to Seek Arbitral Review of the
Arbitrability of Jolley's Termination by Failing to Grieve that
Question in Accordance with Article 13 of the Labor Contract.

In its opening brief. UTA explained in fulP that the Trial Court has in effect
ordered that an arbitrator decide the arbitrability of the Appellee Caroline JolleyChristensen ("Jolley") termination and, in doing so. improperly shifted its statutory

* The Appellees' suggestion that UTA's objection to the "bifurcation of the arbitrator's
role" is unexplained is untenable in the face of UTA's full briefing of its objection to an
arbitrator deciding the arbitrability of Jolley's termination instead of the Trial Court, at
pages 9 through 18 of its Brief.
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responsibility to an arbitrator and contravened the Labor Contract. (UTA Br. At 9-18.)
Under the Labor Contract, an arbitrator cannot reach the contract application question set
out in the First Question presented to the arbitrator in the Order unless the party seeking
review of that question first follows the Labor Contract's Article 1.3 grievance
procedures. The parties to the Labor Contract agreed to separate procedural pathways for
challenging discipline matters on the one hand, and matters of contract interpretation or
application on the other hand. The Appellees do not dispute that they did not file an
Article 13 grievance. By failing to do so. the Appellees passed on their opportunity to
allow an arbitrator to decide whether Jolley's discharge is arbitrable.
The Appellees offer no legal or contractual authority to contradict the Trial
Court's improper delegation of the arbitrability question to an arbitrator. The Appellees
only respond by inferring that an arbitrator must decide the question of whether Jolley
was terminated for reasons relating to work performance because the arbitration of
Jolley's termination involves factual issues. However, judges have often decided factual
disputes to reach an arbitrability decision. See infra at 23-24. In the end. the Trial Court
fell well short of its statutory obligation to fully decide whether Jolley's termination is
arbitrable by sending the arbitrability decision to an arbitrator under the First Question.
B.

The Appellees' Futility Argument Buckles Under the Weight of the
Distinction Between the Article 12 and Article 13 Pathways.

There is no evidence in the record to support the Appellees' claim that filing an
Article 13 grie\ance would have been futile or that the Article 13 proceedings would
have been "hostile". {See Br. Appellees at 24-25.) UTA's refusal to arbitrate the Jolley
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termination under Article 12 did not constitute a refusal to arbitrate an Article 13
grievance regarding its interpretation and application of the Labor Contract. After UTA
refused to arbitrate the termination under the Article 12 discipline review process based
on its interpretation of paragraph A of Article 7 ("Paragraph A"), the Appellees could
have simply filed an Article 13 grievance challenging UTA's interpretation, and
application of that Article to the Jolley termination. The Appellees* present confusion
between UTA's refusal to arbitrate the merits of the Jolley termination, as opposed to
arbitrating the arbitrability of that termination, unravels their futility argument. Simply
put. absent any evidence to the contrary, this Court should presume that UTA would have
followed the Labor Contract and agreed to arbitrate the arbitrability question had the
Appellees properly grieved that issue under Article 13. By electing to pursue the
arbitrability question through the court, the Appellees cannot now shirk the Article 13
requirements and obtain arbitrator review of the arbitrability question. Interestingly,
while the Appellees suggest that following the Labor Contract would have been a waste
of time, using the Article 13 process and presenting the arbitrability question to an
arbitrator would likely have been more expedient.
VIII. THE APPELLEES CANNOT MEANINGFULLY CONTRADICT UTA'S
POSITION THAT, AT A MINIMUM, IT RAISED A REASONABLE
ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 7 THAT
PRECLUDES SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
A,

UTA's Interpretation of the Second and Third Sentences of Paragraph
A Is More Than Reasonable Because It Gives Meaning and Effect to
Both Sentences.
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The Appellees imply that UTA's interpretation of Paragraph A is unreasonable
because, in their view, it "requires [the] Court to ignore specific language of the CBA".6
On the contrary. UTA's interpretation is the only interpretation offered to date that gives
meaning to the bulk of the paragraph at issue here. As argued more fully in UTA's
opening brief, the second and third sentences of that paragraph are rendered meaningless
if they are not interpreted to preclude the arbitration of any probationary employee's
termination. (UTA Br. at 23-29.) In particular, whereas, the Appellees ask this Court
allow the phrase "to perform work" to undermine all of the second and third sentences,
UTA wishes to give full effect to all of the second and third sentences -- including the
phrase "to perform work", as part of the broad grant of discretion to UTA on
probationary employees' work performance in the second sentence.
The phrase "to perform work" cannot be meaningfully read as an exception in the
context of that paragraph. The obvious purpose of that phrase is to modify "ability.

h

The Appellees* contention that UTA's reasonable alternative interpretation argument
was not argued before the Trial Court is unsupported. As explained more fully in its
UTA's opening brief, this argument is implicit when cross-movants for summary
judgment in a contract interpretation case each contend that the language is unambiguous
under each movant's respective interpretation. (Brief of Appellant Utah Transit
Authority ("UTA Br.") at 2.) Notably, the Appellees have offered no authority to the
contrary. In addition, that argument is not an "analytical problem" as postulated by the
Appellees. UTA argued from the beginning that Paragraph A unambiguously prohibits
an arbitration of a probationary employee's termination, and that there is no other
reasonable alternative interpretation other than its own. In doing so. UTA naturally
maintained that its interpretation is more than reasonable.
' The Appellees misstate UTA's position in their Point II by stating that UTA admits in
footnote 4 to its Brief that it ignored words in paragraph A. UTA made no such
admission. On the contrary. UTA wishes to give meaning to all of the words in that
paragraph by preserving the plainly delegated discretion of UTA on probationary
employees' work performance.
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competency, fitness, and qualification" to effectuate the discretion of UTA on decisions
regarding probationary employees in areas related to work. By comparison, the
Appellees argue that the phrase allows for issues unrelated to work performance to be
arbitrated. That isolated reading of the phrase creates an open door for the Union to
challenge UTA *s judgments on probationary employees* work performance based solely
on a hunch, whether legitimate or not. Ultimately then, the Appellees" interpretation of
the phrase "to perform work" nullifies the entire second and third sentences — including
the very phrase upon which they rely — since UTA no longer has meaningful discretion
under the Appellees* interpretation. Thus, Appellees* interpretation of that phrase is
hardly in "harmony with all of the words of that paragraph** as they suggest. Instead,
their interpretation creates disorder in that paragraph by depriving the entire second and
o

third sentences of their clear meaning.
B,

UTA Was Not Obligated to Present Factual Evidence of Intent When
Filing a Motion for Summary Judgment.

The Appellees misconstrue the law when they suggest that UTA was required to
present 'Tactual evidence as to any parties* intent in the drafting of Article 7** at the
summary judgment phase of litigation. (Brief of Appellees at 20.) First, UTA was not
required to bring forward factual evidence in support of its motion for summary judgment
when it argued that Paragraph A is unambiguous. However, when the Trial Court
determined that Paragraph A was not unambiguous in UTA*s favor, then UTA should

s

The Appellees* statement that it has presented the only unambiguous, clear
interpretation of Article 7 holds not weight given the nullification of the second and third
sentences that results from their interpretation.
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have been afforded an opportunity to bring forward extrinsic evidence of the parties*
intent because an ambiguity had been raised by UTA*s reasonable alternative
interpretation. Further, in response to the Appellees" motion for summary judgment.
UTA only needed to present facts sufficient to show a genuine issue of material fact.
Thus, the Appellees* call for factual evidence is premature.
C.

The Trial Court Should Have Resolved Any Ambiguity in Article 7.

The Appellees mistakenly assert that, even if there is a reasonable alternative
interpretation of paragraph A. "any ambiguity should be resolved by a labor arbitrator".
(Br. Appellees at 20.) With that assertion, the Appellees overlook the Trial Court's
obligation under the Utah Arbitration Act to fully determine the arbitrability issue before
that court. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 la-4 (2003). Because UTA presented to the Trial
Court, at a minimum, a reasonable alternative interpretation of paragraph A and an
ambiguity in the language of that paragraph, the Trial Court was required to resolve that
ambiguity by allowing this matter to go to trial to determine if Jolley's termination was
arbitrable. Additionally, as argued infra, an arbitrator cannot resolve the ambiguity
because the Appellees failed to bring a timely Article 13 grievance to move that contract
interpretation and application issue to an arbitrator.
D.

The Trial Court May Decide Factual Issues Embedded in an
Arbitrability Question.

The Appellees* contention that any factual dispute in this matter should be
resolved by an arbitrator is out of step with arbitrability jurisprudence. UTA is unaware
of any prohibition against a trial court determining facts to resolve a threshold arbitration
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the time and effort on the arbitrability question is comparable irrespective of the forum in
which the question is decided, the Appellees* fears of double litigation are overstated.
CONCLUSION
To preserve UTA's constitutional right of appeal of a case from a court of original
jurisdiction to an appellate court, this Court should reject the Appellees* argument that
this Court lacks jurisdiction over a final order compelling arbitration. Further, this Court
has jurisdiction over such final orders under the Judicial Code, and reviews final orders
as a matter of course under Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
For the reasons set forth in Sections VI through IX of this Reply Brief, and in
UTA's opening brief. UTA respectfully requests that this Court reverse the Trial Court's
granting of summary judgment for the Appellees-Plaintiffs, vacate the Order, and either
(1) reverse the denial of. and grant. UTA's motion for summary judgment or (2) remand
this case so that (A) the Trial Court may fully decide the arbitrability question that it is
statutorily required to resolve and that an arbitrator is contractually barred from resolving
in this case and (B) the parties may present extrinsic evidence of the their intent under
Paragraph A.
DATED this 29th day of March. 2004.

Desiree-T^Peri)
Attorney for Appellant
Utah Transit Authority
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question. Moreover, lower courts appear to nave mstoncaiiy maae decisions regarding
disputed facts when ruling on arbitrability. and appellate courts review those decisions.
E.g., Metalclad Corp. v. Ventana Env. Organizational Partnership. 109 Cal. App. 4th
1705, 1715 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). Section 78-3 la-4 of the Act states that the court "will
determine those issues" relating to arbitrability. and will "order or deny arbitration
accordingly". Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-4(l) (Repealed effective May 15. 2003). The
Legislature did not expressly or impliedly suggest that a court could sidestep that
obligation simply because there are factual issues that will need to be resolved to fully
decide the arbitrability question. Accordingly, the Trial Court may hear evidence to
resolve genuine issues of material fact relating to whether Jolley's termination was based
on her work performance.
IX.

THE APPELLEES' FEAR OF DOUBLE LITIGATION IS UNFOUNDED IN
VIEW OF THE TWO-STEP ARBITRATION PROCESS ORDERED BY
THE TRIAL COURT.
The Appellees concern regarding double litigation is unsupported. Regardless of

whether the Trial Court or an arbitrator resolves any issues embedded in the arbitrability
question, the parties will potentially twice expend the time and resources to prove their
respective positions on that question. For instance, under the Order, the parties would
first be heard on the question of whether Jolley's termination was for reasons unrelated to
work performance. (Order at 2.) This is the same question the Trial Court should have
resolved to fully decide arbitrability here. In either forum, the parties will be required to
prepare and to present evidence on that question. If UTA were to lose on that question in
either forum, the parties would still arbitrate the merits of Jolley's termination. Because
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